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The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster 
JOSH CHAFETZ 
This Article argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional. 
After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the 
filibuster.  Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of “unlimited debate,” 
this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote 
requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate. 
Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for 
most Senate business is unconstitutional.  This Part argues that the words “passed” in 
Article I’s description of the legislative process, “determine” in the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause, and “consent” in the Appointments Clause must be understood to 
contain an implicit premise that a determined and focused legislative majority must be 
able to get its way in a reasonable amount of time.  Or, to put it differently, the 
Constitution cannot countenance permanent minority obstruction in a house of 
Congress. 
Part IV responds to the most prominent counterarguments.  First, it rejects the 
counterargument from plenary cameral rule-making authority, arguing that rules 
made pursuant to this authority still cannot run afoul of the structural principle 
described in Part III.  Second, it rejects the counterargument based on historical 
pedigree.  Surveying the history of the House of Commons, the House of 
Representatives, and the Senate, it finds no longstanding tradition in Anglo-American 
legislatures of indefinite minority obstruction.  And third, it rejects the 
counterargument that legislative entrenchment is unproblematic. 
Finally, Part V suggests choreography for eliminating the filibuster.  It begins by 
noting that this is not a matter for Article III courts; the arguments here are—and must 
be—addressed to constitutionally conscientious Senators.  It then suggests that the 
filibuster need not be eliminated at the beginning of a new Congress; if the filibuster is 
unconstitutional, then the presiding officer may so rule at any time, and the Senate may 
uphold that ruling by simple majority.  Finally, it notes that the filibuster need not be 
replaced with a simple majority cloture rule and suggests potential alternatives. 
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The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster 
JOSH CHAFETZ* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On January 19, 2010, Republican Scott Brown surprised most of the 
political cognoscenti by winning the Massachusetts Senate seat left vacant 
by Edward Kennedy’s death the previous August.1  As a result, the United 
States Senate had fifty-seven Democrats, two Independents who caucused 
with the Democrats, and forty-one Republicans.  A blogger for the Village 
Voice penned a post headlined, “Scott Brown Wins Mass. Race, Giving 
GOP 41–59 Majority in the Senate,”2 a line that President Obama quoted a 
couple of weeks later.3 
Because a version had already passed the Senate, the healthcare reform 
bill, which had taken up much of Congress’s attention for the preceding 
year, became law on March 23, 20104—after two more months of Sturm 
und Drang.5  A number of other Democratic priorities, however, including 
a comprehensive energy and climate change bill that had already passed 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  This Article was originally prepared for the 
Connecticut Law Review’s 2010 “Is Our Constitutional Order Broken?” Symposium, and I am grateful 
to the Symposium organizers and participants for their comments.  Thanks also to Akhil Amar, Aaron 
Bruhl, Gerard Magliocca, David Pozen, Catherine Roach, Larry Solum, Michael Stern, Keith Werhan, 
and the participants in the Tulane Law School Faculty Workshop for helpful and thought-provoking 
comments on earlier drafts.  Ava Jacobi and Lisa Wertheimer provided excellent research assistance.  
Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own. 
1 See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A1.   
2 Roy Edroso, Scott Brown Wins Mass. Race, Giving GOP 41–59 Majority in the Senate, 
VILLAGE VOICE BLOG (Jan. 20, 2010, 12:44 PM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/ 
2010/01/scott_brown_win.php.  
3 President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Senate Democratic Policy Committee Issues 
Conference and a Question-and-Answer Session, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 3, 2010). 
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
5 Although both the House and the Senate had passed versions of the bill at the time of the 
Massachusetts special election, the differences between the bills were still in the process of being 
ironed out in conference committee.  Because Senate Democrats no longer had the sixty votes 
necessary to achieve cloture on the conference report, the only way to enact the bill was to have the 
House pass the identical bill that the Senate had already passed.  A number of House members, 
however, balked at some of the Senate bill’s provisions.  Ultimately, the House passed the Senate bill, 
and both chambers immediately passed a number of negotiated “fixes” in a separate bill, which was 
eligible to pass with limited debate under the Senate’s restrictive budget reconciliation procedure.  For 
narratives of the bill’s passage, see STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
AMERICA’S NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 49–62 (2010); Jonathan 
Cohn, How They Did It: The Inside Account of Health Care Reform’s Triumph, NEW REPUBLIC, June 
10, 2010, at 14, 24–25.  For a description of the reconciliation procedure, see STAFF OF S. COMM. ON 
THE BUDGET, 105TH CONG., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: AN EXPLANATION, S. PRT. NO. 
105-67, at 20–22 (Comm. Print 1998). 
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the House6 and a number of pending nominations,7 fell by the wayside. 
It seems peculiar, to say the least, that sizeable and determined 
majorities in both houses of Congress, working in conjunction with the 
President, would be unable to enact the legislation or confirm the nominees 
they favor.  And yet such is the state of the Senate in early twenty-first-
century America.  In this Article, I argue that it is not only peculiar; it is 
unconstitutional.8 
Part II will take up the issue of the referent of that tricky indexical “it” 
in the previous sentence—that is, this Part will ask what, exactly, the 
modern filibuster is, as both a formal and a functional matter.  Part III will 
sketch a fairly simple structural argument for the unconstitutionality of the 
filibuster as described in Part II.  Part IV will respond to the most 
prominent counterarguments, which attempt to justify the constitutionality 
of the filibuster on the grounds of plenary cameral rulemaking authority, 
historical pedigree, and the acceptability of legislative entrenchment.  
Finally, assuming that the preceding three Parts have persuaded you that 
today’s filibuster is, in fact, unconstitutional, Part V will discuss possible 
choreography for eliminating it. 
II.  WHAT IS THE FILIBUSTER? 
A.  Formally 
The word “filibuster” appears nowhere in the standing rules of the 
Senate.  Our first task, then, is definitional:  What are we talking about 
when we talk about the filibuster?  The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
a filibuster simply as “[a]n act of obstruction in a legislative assembly,”9 
while Black’s Law Dictionary offers a somewhat more focused definition:  
“A dilatory tactic, esp. prolonged and often irrelevant speechmaking, 
employed in an attempt to obstruct legislative action.”10  And a recent 
comprehensive study of the phenomenon by political scientist Gregory 
Koger defines filibustering as “legislative behavior (or a threat of such 
                                                                                                                          
6 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).  
7 See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, Political Logjam on Federal Judgeships, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2010, at 7 (noting, inter alia, that “two key 9th Circuit appointments were sent back to the White 
House, effectively scuttling the chances of UC Berkeley law professor Goodwin Liu joining the appeals 
court or San Francisco Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen being elevated to the U.S. District Court for 
Northern California”). 
8 I began sketching out my argument for the unconstitutionality of the contemporary filibuster in 
Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Debate, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 245 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Filibuster.pdf.  The arguments 
presented here are a significant elaboration on—and in some cases, minor modification of—the 
arguments there.  I again thank Mike Gerhardt for being such a probing and gracious sparring partner. 
9 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 906 (2d ed. 1989). 
10 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 704 (9th ed. 2009).  
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behavior) intended to delay a collective decision for strategic gain.”11  As 
Koger observes—and as this Article will discuss in more detail later12—
filibustering has varied dramatically in its tactics, its frequency, and its 
efficacy throughout the history of the United States Congress.13 
The form that the filibuster takes today, however, is rather simple to 
describe.  As a formal matter, a filibuster occurs when a Senator or group 
of Senators takes advantage of the chamber’s “practice of unlimited 
debate”14 in order to delay or obstruct a measure.  The only way to end 
debate and force a vote on most measures is to invoke cloture, as governed 
by Senate Rule XXII.  Under that rule, if sixteen Senators sign a cloture 
petition, then, two calendar days during which the Senate sits15 later, the 
presiding officer will ask whether “it [is] the sense of the Senate that the 
debate shall be brought to a close?”16  Because a cloture motion is non-
debatable, a vote must be taken immediately upon the question being put.  
If “three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn”—that is, sixty 
Senators, assuming no vacancies—vote to answer that question in the 
affirmative, then no business is in order other than the matter on which 
cloture has been invoked.17  Debate on that measure is limited to thirty 
hours once cloture has been successfully invoked, at the end of which a 
vote on the underlying measure must be taken.18  “No dilatory motion, or 
dilatory amendment, or amendment not germane shall be in order” during 
the thirty-hour post-cloture period, and no Senator may speak for more 
than one hour during that period.19  In essence, once cloture has been 
invoked, procedure in the Senate comes more closely to resemble 
procedure in the House.20 
There is, however, one very important exception to the sixty-vote 
requirement for cloture.  Invoking cloture on a motion to amend the Senate 
rules requires “two-thirds of the Senators present and voting.”21  In other 
words, invoking cloture on a motion to change the rules—say, to change 
the rules by lowering the threshold for invoking cloture—will almost 
always require an even greater supermajority than is needed to invoke 
                                                                                                                          
11 GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE 
AND SENATE 16 (2010).  
12 See infra Section IV.B.  
13 See generally KOGER, supra note 11, at 37–187.  
14 FLOYD M. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES 568 (1981).  
15 That is, if the petition is presented on Wednesday, then the cloture vote takes place on Friday.  
If the petition is presented on Friday, then the vote takes place on Tuesday (assuming that the Senate 
was not in session on Saturday or Sunday).  
16 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, at 16 (2007) (R. XXII.2). 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, HOW CONGRESS WORKS 90 (4th ed. 2008) (describing the 
limits on dilatory tactics at all times in the modern House).  
21 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 16, at 16 (R. XXII.2).  
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cloture on any other type of measure.  Moreover, the Senate, unlike the 
House, considers itself a “continuing body,” which means that its rules 
never expire.22  The supermajority requirement for cloture is thus firmly 
entrenched in the Senate rules: it cannot be lowered unless at least two-
thirds of the Senators present and voting are willing to support cloture on a 
motion to lower it.  Although this state of affairs has been subject to 
significant criticism, a brief attempt in early 2011 to reform the filibuster 
sputtered out with a small package of toothless “reforms.”23 
This, then, is the formal picture of the contemporary filibuster: so long 
as a single Senator wishes to speak, her colleagues cannot silence her and 
move to a vote unless they can muster sixty votes to do so.  Moreover, they 
cannot end debate on a motion to lower that sixty-vote threshold unless 
they can muster sixty-seven votes (assuming full attendance)24 to do so. 
B.  Functionally 
To complete our picture of how the filibuster actually works, we need 
to recognize that what was once an extraordinary procedure has now 
become thoroughly routine.25  Cloture is now a de facto requirement for the 
passage of any significant measure—and this is a very recent phenomenon.  
When cloture was first introduced into Senate rules in 1917, it required a 
two-thirds vote to pass.26  The threshold was lowered to its current, sixty-
vote, requirement in 1975.27  The table below28 traces the rise of cloture in 
five-Congress intervals, beginning with the 66th Congress in 1919–1921. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
22 See RIDDICK, supra note 14, at 991–95.  For incisive criticism of the implications of the 
“continuing body” view of the Senate, see generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing 
Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1401 (2010).  
23 See Cong. Q. Staff, Senate Ends ‘Secret Holds’, CONGRESS.ORG, Jan. 28, 2011, 
http://www.congress.org/news/2011/01/28/senate_ends_secret_holds.  
24 Given the high salience and importance of a motion to lower the cloture threshold, and given 
that cloture motions cannot be voted upon until (at least) two calendar days after they are submitted, it 
seems reasonable to assume a high level of attendance for the vote to invoke cloture on a motion to 
amend the Senate rules to lower the cloture threshold.  
25 Aaron Bruhl paints a similar portrait of the contemporary Senate in his contribution to this 
Symposium.  See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041 
(2011). 
26 See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 198 (1997).  
27 See KOGER, supra note 11, at 176.  
28 All data in this table are from Senate Action on Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2011).  
 2011] THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FILIBUSTER 1009 
 
 
Congresses Years Cloture 
Motions 
Filed 
Cloture 
Votes 
Cloture 
Invoked 
66th–70th 1919–1929 11 10 4 
71st–75th 1929–1939 5 3 0 
76th–80th 1939–1949 8 6 0 
81st–85th 1949–1959 3 3 0 
86th–90th 1959–1969 22 21 4 
91st–95th 1969–1979 136 97 33 
96th–100th 1979–1989 197 135 54 
101st–105th 1989–1999 329 221 75 
106th–110th 1999–2009 411 334 169 
  
The trend is unmistakable—and a more fine-grained picture tells an 
even starker story.  Through the 109th Congress (2005–2007), there had 
never been more than eighty-two cloture motions filed (104th Congress), 
sixty-one cloture votes (107th Congress), or thirty-four invocations of 
cloture (107th and 109th Congresses).29  In the 110th Congress (2007–
2009), there were one hundred thirty-nine cloture motions filed, one 
hundred twelve votes on cloture, and cloture was invoked sixty-one 
times.30  In other words, that one Congress had 69.5% more cloture 
motions filed, 83.6% more cloture votes, and 79.4% more successful 
invocations of cloture than any Congress had ever had before.  And the 
111th Congress (2009–2011) followed suit, with one hundred thirty-six 
cloture motions filed, ninety-one votes on cloture, and sixty-three 
invocations of cloture.31 
Clearly, this cannot be attributed to the nature of the legislation under 
consideration.  Just to take one example, the Democrats never had a 
filibuster-proof majority during the 73rd Congress (1933–1935), and there 
was not a single cloture motion even filed during that Congress.32  And yet 
that Congress passed the programs of the First New Deal, including the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act,33 the Securities Act of 1933,34 the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933,35 and the National Industrial Recovery Act,36 among 
many others.  Rather, the data on cloture petitions and votes indicate that 
                                                                                                                          
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).  
34 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).  
35 Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
36 Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
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cloture has simply become another standard procedural hurdle that almost 
all significant legislation must clear.  In short, as any number of observers 
have recognized, it can now accurately be said that it requires sixty votes to 
pass a bill through the Senate.37 
Several reasons have been suggested for the rise of the “sixty-vote 
Senate.”  One major culprit is likely the introduction of separate legislative 
“tracks” in the early 1970s by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield.  
“Tracking”—which did not involve any formal change to the Senate 
rules—is a procedure by which the Majority Leader, acting with the 
approval of the Minority Leader, can keep more than one bill pending on 
the Senate floor as unfinished business.38  The effect of the tracking system 
is that a filibuster no longer ties up the business of the Senate.  Once a 
Senator announces an intention to filibuster a measure, the issue is simply 
kept on the back burner unless the majority can muster the sixty votes for 
cloture.  This, of course, significantly decreases the costs of filibustering—
no longer must a filibusterer justify his tying up the entire business of the 
Senate to his constituents or colleagues, and no longer must a filibusterer 
summon the physical endurance to hold the Senate floor.39  With such 
reduced costs, there was no longer any reason to treat the filibuster as an 
extraordinary measure, used in cases in which the minority had very 
intense preferences.  The tracking system—or, more generally, the 
unwillingness of the Senate majority to use attrition as a means of breaking 
filibusters40—has enabled the filibuster to become regularized. 
Other factors have undoubtedly aided in the rise of the sixty-vote 
Senate, as well.  Many congressional observers have detected a shift in 
Senate culture that has resulted in Senators being less concerned about 
antagonizing their colleagues.41  And national partisan realignment may 
                                                                                                                          
37 See, e.g., KOGER, supra note 11, at 3 (describing “the ability of [S]enators to block bills and 
nominations unless 60 percent of the Senate votes to override a ‘filibuster’”); Chafetz & Gerhardt, 
supra note 8, at 247–49 (Chafetz Opening Statement) (making this point); id. at 255 (Gerhardt 
Rebuttal) (accepting this description); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 182 (“[I]t is now 
commonly said that sixty votes in the Senate, rather than a simple majority, are necessary to pass 
legislation and confirm nominations.”); David R. Mayhew, Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 31, 31 (2003) (“Automatic failure for bills not reaching the 60 mark.  That is the 
current Senate practice . . . .”). 
38 SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 15 (1997); WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE 
POLICY PROCESS 212 (7th ed. 2007); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 201. 
39 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 203 (“The stealth filibuster is easier, both physically 
and politically . . . .”); Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, A One-Track Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 2010, at A27 (“Not only has it become easier to ‘filibuster,’ but tracking means there are far fewer 
consequences when the minority party or even one willful member of Congress does so, because the 
Senate can carry on with other things.”). 
40 Koger views the tracking system as “a minor reform that is symptomatic of a broader shift from 
attrition to cloture as the dominant response to obstruction.”  KOGER, supra note 11, at 137.  
41 See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS 
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 146–69 (updated ed. 2008) (identifying a 
decline in institutional identity and asserting that it has led to Senators’ favoring short-term political 
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have contributed as well, by creating more ideologically homogenous 
parties42 that were willing to use all tools at their disposal to hinder the 
other party’s agenda.  But regardless of the precise constellation of reasons 
for the rapid growth in filibustering, two things are pellucidly clear: (1) the 
filibuster as practiced today has almost nothing to do with debating an 
issue; and (2) the filibuster is no longer reserved for issues of unusual 
importance or on which preferences are unusually intense.  A Senator who 
intends to vote against final passage of a bill need no longer separately 
justify her decision to vote against cloture—indeed, if anything, a Senator 
who intends to vote against final passage but votes for cloture must explain 
the seeming inconsistency.  And this state of affairs has been thoroughly 
internalized by Senators: a measure that cannot command the support of 
sixty Senators is unlikely even to be introduced onto the Senate floor.  At 
least for purposes of political obstruction, the Village Voice blogger was 
on-point: forty-one votes is all a party needs to kill proposals it does not 
like.43 
*** 
Combining the formal and functional pictures, we are now in a 
position to put the question of the filibuster’s constitutionality more 
precisely.  In the Senate today, a supermajority of sixty Senators is 
required to pass a bill.  Moreover, an even larger supermajority of sixty-
seven is required to alter that supermajority requirement.  Is this state of 
affairs consistent with the Constitution?  My answer to that question, 
which I will explain in the next Part, is no. 
III.  THE (SIMPLE) STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE FILIBUSTER 
The Senate’s cloture rule—indeed, all of its rules—are grounded in 
each chamber’s constitutional power to “determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings.”44  The Constitution also gives the Senate the power to 
“Judge . . . the Elections . . . of its own Members.”45  Suppose, then, that 
the Senate adopted the following rule to guide its judgment of elections: 
In any election to this body in which a current Senator seeks 
                                                                                                                          
gain over long-term institutional efficacy); see also KOGER, supra note 11, at 160–61 (suggesting that 
Senate norms were effective in an earlier period in restraining use of the filibuster). 
42 See EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 379 (2002) (noting 
that in the 1990s, “[c]onservative Democrats . . . almost disappeared as the Republican party became 
the undisputed new home of southern conservatism.  At the same time the Democrats’ ideological 
center of gravity moved into the liberal or national range.  The result was a significant clarification of 
party and ideology.”). 
43 See Edroso, supra note 2.  
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
45 Id. § 5, cl. 1.  
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reelection, the current Senator shall be deemed reelected 
unless sixty percent or more of the duly qualified voters cast 
their votes for another candidate.46 
There is no clear piece of constitutional text denying the Senate the power 
to pass this rule.  After all, the Seventeenth Amendment provides that “the 
Senate . . . shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by 
the people thereof,” and that “[t]he electors in each State shall have the 
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the 
State legislatures,”47 but nowhere does it say that the candidate with the 
most votes must win.48  Indeed, nothing in the Constitution explicitly 
provides for majority rule in congressional elections. 
And yet this hypothetical rule simply cannot be constitutional.  A 
Constitution written in the name of We the People cannot tolerate this sort 
of self-entrenchment by incumbents.  Indeed, it is the self-entrenching and 
self-dealing nature of this hypothetical rule that gives it its constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
46 I used this same hypothetical in Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 246 (Chafetz Opening 
Statement).  Anyone familiar with the concept of bipartisan gerrymandering—that is, the practice by 
which majority and minority parties collude in the shared interest of incumbency protection—will 
recognize that my hypothetical rule, if it were constitutional, might well garner significant levels of 
support from sitting Senators of both parties.  See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to 
Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 572 (2004) 
(defining a bipartisan gerrymander as “a nonaggression pact between the parties in which they agree to 
divide up a state in favor of incumbent sinecure” and noting that bipartisan gerrymandering is 
pervasive). 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.  
48 Mike Gerhardt suggests that my hypothetical is unconstitutional because it violates the 
Qualifications Clause and “federalism principles,” rather than the structural principle that I describe 
below.  Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 263 (Gerhardt Closing Statement).  But Gerhardt is 
begging the question.  The hypothetical rule would only violate the Qualifications Clause if it were 
adding a new qualification for serving in the Senate.  And it would only be adding a new qualification 
if we assume that the existing constitutional rule is that whoever gets the most votes wins the seat.  In 
other words, the Qualifications Clause argument assumes as its premise precisely the structural 
principle for which I am arguing. 
And the same goes for the federalism argument, which Gerhardt describes as focusing on “state 
sovereignty to organize local elections in accordance with other constitutional provisions, including the 
Seventeenth Amendment.”  Id.  The formalist response to this point would be that my hypothetical rule 
says nothing about state organization of elections—it simply sets out how the Senate will exercise its 
undisputed power of judging those elections and their returns.  And this formalist argument points to a 
deeper structural point: one of the purposes of giving each house the power to judge the elections, 
returns, and qualifications of its own members was to act as a check on the states.  See JOSH CHAFETZ, 
DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH 
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 174–76 (2007) (describing the historical use of this power in order to 
oversee state election procedures).  The houses are not required to accept either state electoral 
procedures or state returns as conclusive.  It is surely the case that the Senate could refuse to seat a 
candidate (even a candidate whom the state authorities had certified as the winner) on the grounds that 
a Senate investigation revealed that the candidate’s opponent actually received more votes.  See, e.g., 
id. at 174 (describing the Spaulding v. Mead controversy in the 9th Congress (1805–1807)).  Indeed, if 
this were not the case, then the Senate’s power to judge elections would be reduced to a nullity.  If 
federalism principles allow for that but do not allow for my hypothetical rule, then it must be because 
there is some constitutional difference between majority (or at least plurality) rule and supermajority 
rule.  That is to say, once again, Gerhardt’s argument assumes as its premise the structural principle for 
which I am arguing. 
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dimension.  Ordinarily, the right response to bad legislative behavior is to 
“throw the bums out.”  But here, the bad legislative behavior cannot be 
fixed by the normal political process precisely because it distorts that 
process, making it significantly harder to throw the bums out.  This sort of 
entrenchment of the status quo of legislative personnel against change 
simply cannot be squared with popular sovereignty.49  That is to say, we 
understand the phrase “elected by the people”50 implicitly to include the 
principle that the candidate with the most votes has to win.51  Any use of 
the Senate’s power under the Rules of Proceedings Clause that frustrates 
this principle must be unconstitutional. 
But it would be more than a little strange to say that the candidate with 
the most votes must win election to the legislature, but, within the 
legislature, the policy with the most votes need not win.  Or put differently, 
it seems quite odd to say that the Constitution prohibits supermajoritarian 
entrenchment of legislators while allowing a nearly identical entrenchment 
of legislation.  After all, it is hard to see how legislators we cannot get rid 
of are any more inimical to popular sovereignty than policies we cannot get 
rid of.  A legislature that can make its law unrepealable even by a 
determined majority continues to rule us even after its members have been 
voted out of office.  If “elected by the people” in the Seventeenth 
Amendment must contain the principle that the candidate with the most 
votes has to win the election—and I have argued above that it must—then 
it is hard to understand how “passed” in Article I’s description of the 
legislative process,52 “determine” in the Rules of Proceedings Clause,53 and 
“consent” in the Appointments Clause54 can be sensibly construed so as to 
allow the sustained and systemic thwarting of majority will.  As Jed 
Rubenfeld has argued:  “What it means for a bill to ‘pass’ the House or 
                                                                                                                          
49 Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 120 (1980) 
(“We cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out . . . .”).  As Akhil Amar has noted, the Constitution is 
deeply concerned with preventing self-dealing by those in power.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 68, 74, 288, 433 (2005); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, at xiii, 17–19, 68, 85–86, 117, 130, 244 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, 
America’s Constitution, Written and Unwritten, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 267, 270 (2007).   
50 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.  
51 I previously described this as a principle of “majoritarianism.”  Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 
8, at 246 (Chafetz Opening Statement).  That phrasing was inapt, however; in a race with more than 
two candidates, there is no structural problem with a plurality winner.  I thank Akhil Amar for bringing 
this point to my attention.  
52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 
United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
53 See id. § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).  
54 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
supreme Court, and all other [principal] Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 1014 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1003 
Senate is not open for definition by the House or Senate.  It is 
constitutionally fixed by the implicit majority rule meaning of ‘passed.’”55  
To put it more starkly:  Why should we care whether or not legislators can 
entrench themselves in office if we are going to allow them to entrench 
everything they do while in office? 
Of course, the Constitution itself requires supermajorities in some 
circumstances.56  But the very weightiness of the issues for which the 
Constitution provides supermajority requirements—impeachment,57 
expulsion,58 veto overrides,59 treaty ratifications,60 constitutional 
amendments,61 etc.—should indicate that a majority otherwise suffices.  
True, it is logically possible to read the Constitution as leaving the voting 
rule in all other cases up to the chamber’s rules;62 nevertheless, it would be 
structurally strange to allow the Senate to impose a higher threshold for 
passing ordinary legislation than for passing a proposed constitutional 
amendment or voting to override a presidential veto.63  Yet, if the Senate 
can require sixty votes for passage, why not seventy or eighty? 
It may, at this point, be objected that our Constitution has any number 
of anti-majoritarian devices beyond those enumerated supermajority 
requirements.  The malapportionment of the Senate,64 to take just one 
example, means that popular majorities often will not translate into 
legislative majorities.  If the Constitution countenances the thwarting of the 
will of a majority of the people, this objection runs, then why would it be 
especially concerned with the thwarting of the will of a majority of 
Senators?  Indeed, are checks on majoritarianism not central to Madisonian 
design? 
But this objection proves too much.  The mere fact that our 
Constitution has some anti-majoritarian elements should not serve as a 
bootstrap by which any anti-majoritarian device is made constitutionally 
legitimate.  Indeed, this objection would equally serve to legitimate the 
                                                                                                                          
55 Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 83 
(1996). 
56 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 
455 n.38 (2004) (listing the seven supermajority requirements in the Constitution). 
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.  
58 Id. § 5, cl. 2.  
59 Id. § 7, cl. 2.  
60 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
61 Id. art. V.  
62 See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 456 (“One may read the Constitution as requiring 
supermajority voting in seven specified instances but leaving each chamber free to design its own rules 
or voting requirements to govern its internal affairs.”).  
63 Both constitutional amendments and veto overrides require two-thirds votes in each house of 
Congress—although constitutional amendments need not take the congressional route at all.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (veto overrides); id. art. V (constitutional amendments).  
64 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 50–62 (2006); Suzanna Sherry, 
Our Unconstitutional Senate, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 95, 95–
97 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).  
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hypothetical Senate rule with which this Part began.65  Rather than use 
some deviations from majoritarianism to justify still others, we should take 
note of the essential popular sovereignty foundations of our Constitution66 
and insist that, in such a polity, minority veto cannot be piled atop minority 
veto indefinitely.  The Constitution—our higher law67—specifies certain 
deviations from majoritarianism.  But the exceptions should not be allowed 
to swallow the rule, nor should antimajoritarian devices in higher law be 
used to justify antimajoritarian devices in ordinary law. 
I should be clear here: the principle I am advocating is not that the 
Constitution requires the immediate fulfillment of every wish of the 
legislative majority.  After all, all procedural rules delay the 
implementation of majority will to some extent, and all rulemaking has at 
least something of an entrenching effect.  The principle that I believe to be 
implicit in constitutional structure is more modest than that.  It is simply 
that the Constitution cannot countenance permanent minority obstruction 
in a house of Congress.  Or, to describe it from the other side, a determined 
and focused legislative majority must be able to get its way in a reasonable 
amount of time.  This is, of course, a standard, not a rule.  A 
constitutionally conscientious Senator would have to exercise her judgment 
in determining what the line should be between acceptable procedural rules 
and unacceptable permanent minority obstruction.68 
For instance, I would think it permissible to maintain the sixty-vote 
requirement for cloture, so long as it was clearly the case that the cloture 
rule could be changed by majority vote at any time.  In other words, a 
determined majority could go through a three-step process—first voting to 
lower the cloture threshold, then voting for cloture on the matter at issue 
under the new threshold, then voting on the underlying matter.  True, the 
three-step process would involve delay and would alter the shape of the 
deliberations.  It would focus Senators’ minds on whether they thought that 
                                                                                                                          
65 See supra text accompanying note 46.  
66 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 152 (1988) (“The history of popular sovereignty in both England and 
America after 1689 can be read as a history of the successive efforts of different generations to bring 
the facts into closer conformity with the fiction, efforts that have gradually transformed the very 
structure of society.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 34–37 (2000) (discussing the centrality of popular 
sovereignty to the Constitution); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: 
Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 
(1994) (“The central pillar of Republican Government, I claim, is popular sovereignty.  In a Republican 
Government, the people rule.  They do not necessarily rule directly, day-to-day.  Republican 
Government probably does not (as some have claimed) prohibit all forms of direct democracy, such as 
initiative and referendum, but neither does it require ordinary lawmaking via these direct populist 
mechanisms.” (internal footnote omitted)).  
67 See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1022, 1039–43 (1984) (distinguishing ordinary lawmaking within constitutional procedures from the 
higher lawmaking by which those procedures themselves are established).  
68 See infra Part V.C (discussing acceptable options short of majority cloture).  
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the underlying issue was important enough to justify changing the rules of 
the game.69  It would also, perhaps, focus Senators’ minds on the purposes 
for which cloture was being used.  A Senator who favored the underlying 
measure might nevertheless be inclined to vote against lowering the cloture 
threshold if she were convinced that cloture was being sought to cut off 
actual debate.  On the other hand, the Senator might be more willing to 
support the rules change if cloture were being sought to end sheer minority 
obstruction.  I see no objection from constitutional structure in focusing 
Senators’ minds in this way.  In the end, a determined majority, willing to 
spend the time, energy, and political capital, could still get its measure 
through the chamber.  There are undoubtedly other ways of protecting the 
Senate’s tradition of extensive debate—and its role as the cooling saucer of 
legislation70—without violating the structural principle described above.  
But the Senate’s current filibuster practice clearly does violate that 
principle.  
IV.  THE COUNTERARGUMENTS 
A.  The Counterargument from Plenary Cameral Rulemaking Authority 
The text-based counterargument to the position described above is 
simple.  The Rules of Proceedings Clause71 “specifie[s] no limitations on 
the procedures that the House or Senate may devise for its proceedings” 
and therefore “plainly grants to the Senate plenary authority to devise 
procedures for internal governance, and the filibuster is a rule for 
debate.”72  The filibuster is therefore within the Senate’s constitutional 
power under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. 
But this argument confuses a necessary condition for constitutionality 
with a sufficient one.  For Senate Rule XXII to be constitutional, it is 
necessary that the Senate have the authority to promulgate procedural 
rules, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause provides such authority.  But 
this is not the end of the matter, because a rule might still be 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates some other constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
69 In this regard, the three-step process would be akin to requiring a “second opinion” from the 
same opinion-giver—a process which Adrian Vermeule has noted can lead to cooler and more sober 
judgments.  See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions 9, 11–13 (Harvard Law Sch. Public Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10-38, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646414. 
70 According to an oft-told tale, 
[t]here is a tradition that, on his return from France, Jefferson called Washington to 
account at the breakfast-table for having agreed to a second chamber.  “Why,” asked 
Washington, “did you pour that coffee into your saucer?”  “To cool it,” quoth 
Jefferson.  “Even so,” said Washington, “we pour legislation into the senatorial 
saucer to cool it.”  
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 359 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
72 Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 253 (Gerhardt Rebuttal).  
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principle.  Consider, for example, a federal law banning the interstate sale 
of newsmagazines.  This is a regulation of interstate commerce—and 
therefore falls within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.73  It 
is nevertheless unconstitutional, because it runs afoul of the First 
Amendment.74  Or consider a Senate rule banning Jews from serving on 
committees.  This falls within the Senate’s power under the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause.  Yet it, too, is unconstitutional—it violates the 
Religious Test Clause.75  Power for Congress to legislate, or for the Senate 
to make rules, is the first step.  But the second step is ensuring that the 
legislation or rule promulgated pursuant to that power does not violate 
some independent constitutional stricture. 
Just as the Constitution forbids religious tests and abridgements of the 
freedom of the press, I have argued above that it also forbids permanent 
minority obstruction in a house of Congress.76  An insistence that the Rules 
of Proceedings Clause grants the Senate plenary power over cameral rules 
no more frees Senate rules from having to comply with that structural 
stricture than it does from having to comply with the Religious Test Clause 
or the First Amendment. 
B.  The Counterargument from History 
Defenders of the filibuster will frequently turn to history, asserting an 
unbroken practice stretching back to time immemorial supporting the 
filibuster.77  But it is important to be clear what we are talking about.  Any 
purported history of “unlimited debate” is immaterial, because, as we have 
already seen, the modern filibuster is not about debate.  If historical 
practice is to justify the modern filibuster, then it must be historical 
practice of something resembling the modern filibuster.  And, as noted 
above, the defining characteristic of the modern filibuster is that it 
functions as a sixty-vote requirement for the passage of measures through 
the Senate.  Put succinctly, then, historical practice justifying today’s 
filibuster would have to be historical practice establishing a right of 
indefinite obstruction by a cameral minority.  Viewed that way, the 
historical record is emphatically not pro-filibuster. 
Consider, first, the British experience.78  Although debate in 
                                                                                                                          
73 U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
74 Id. amend. I.  
75 Id. art. VI, cl. 3.  
76 See supra Part III.  
77 See Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 451–55; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 496–99 
(1995). 
78 As I have noted elsewhere, British parliamentary practice formed the background against which 
American congressional practice developed.  See CHAFETZ, supra note 48, at 2–3; Josh Chafetz, 
Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2009) [hereinafter Chafetz, 
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Parliament was long free from formal limits, political norms kept 
minorities from using debate for purposes of indefinite obstruction in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  As Josef Redlich explained it, a 
distinctly English “political prudence” long “secure[d] the majority against 
abuse of the principle of the protection of the minority.”79  Of course, that 
political prudence was largely the effect of a pre-Reform Act politics in 
which aristocratic patronage served as a gatekeeper to the lower house, 
thus ensuring “[g]entlemanly debates, [and] gentlemanly parliamentary 
procedure.”80  The great parliamentary reforms and expansions of the 
franchise in the mid-nineteenth century eroded these “gentlemanly” norms, 
and the issue of parliamentary obstruction, in particular, came to the fore in 
the 1870s and 1880s. 
Specifically, it was the formation of the Irish nationalist “Home Rule” 
party and the rise of Charles Stewart Parnell that first brought the issue of 
long-term parliamentary obstruction to the fore.81  After the 1874 general 
election, Home Rulers had fifty-nine seats at Westminster,82 and yet, in 
their determination “strictly to follow English parliamentary tradition,” 
they found that they were unable to focus the House’s attention on Irish 
issues.83  In 1875, the twenty-eight year old Charles Stewart Parnell won a 
by-election in the constituency of Meath as a Home Ruler, and he was off 
to London.84  Impatient with the conservative tactics of Isaac Butt, then the 
leader of the Home Rulers in Parliament, Parnell undertook a study of 
previous instances of parliamentary obstruction.85  Although there were a 
few precedents, they consisted of “short transient episode[s]” of “emphatic 
protest.”86  It was Parnell’s innovation to turn transient protest into 
permanent war.  In Redlich’s words, Parnell saw himself as the “enemy” of 
the House.87  In keeping with this view of his role, he used obstructive 
                                                                                                                          
Contempt]; Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House 
of Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 214–15 (2008) [hereinafter Chafetz, Resignation].  
79 1 JOSEF REDLICH, THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: A STUDY OF ITS HISTORY 
AND PRESENT FORM 132 (A. Ernest Steinthal trans., 1908).  
80 Geddes W. Rutherford, Some Aspects of Parliamentary Obstruction, 22 SEWANEE REV. 166, 
171–72 (1914).  
81 On the Home Rule movement and Parnell’s rise to the leadership thereof, see ROBERT KEE, 
THE LAUREL AND THE IVY: THE STORY OF CHARLES STEWART PARNELL AND IRISH NATIONALISM 64–
66 (1993); 1 R. BARRY O’BRIEN, THE LIFE OF CHARLES STEWART PARNELL 44–69 (Greenwood Press, 
1969) (1898). 
82 1 REDLICH, supra note 79, at 135.  
83 Id. at 136.  
84 1 O’BRIEN, supra note 81, at 78–79.  
85 Id. at 269–70.  
86 1 REDLICH, supra note 79, at 139; see also ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: 
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES AND THE COURSE OF BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 279 
(1922) (noting that, with Parnell, the use of obstructive tactics “grew to be really serious and compelled 
reform of procedure”); Rutherford, supra note 80, at 174 (“Before Parnell took his seat in the House of 
Commons obstruction had been a sort of transient episode, arising from the temper of the opposition, 
and was little more than an emphatic protest against the conduct of an overbearing majority.”). 
87 1 REDLICH, supra note 79, at 140.  
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tactics, not simply to combat individual pieces of legislation, but to bring 
the entire functioning of Parliament to a halt.88  In short, Parnell “was the 
founder of systematic obstruction”89 in Parliament—the kind of obstruction 
that looks a lot like the filibuster in the modern American Senate. 
And the House had very little patience for Parnell’s tactics.  As early 
as 1877, an exchange with Parnell prompted Speaker Henry Brand to 
announce that: 
[T]he House is perfectly well aware that any Member 
wilfully and persistently obstructing Public Business, without 
just and reasonable cause, is guilty of a contempt of this 
House; and is liable to punishment, whether by censure, by 
suspension from the service of this House, or by 
commitment, according to the judgment of the House.90 
Stafford Northcote, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, then immediately 
moved that Parnell be held in contempt and suspended from sitting for a 
week and a half;91 after some discussion, debate was adjourned without 
taking any action on the motion.92  Northcote, however, was not done with 
Parnell.  Two days later, he moved two resolutions, both of which were 
meant to create session rules to address obstruction by the Home Rulers.  
The second resolution limited dilatory motions in the Committee of the 
Whole House, and it passed with relatively little debate.93  The first, 
however, provoked sustained debate.  That resolution provided that, if a 
Member were twice declared out of order during a debate, and if the 
Speaker or the Chairman of Committees declared that Member to be 
“disregarding the authority of the Chair,” then a motion could immediately 
be made that the Member not be allowed to speak for the remainder of the 
debate.  That motion would be non-debatable, except that the Member in 
question would be allowed to explain himself.94  In other words, at the 
Chair’s discretion, a Member making a nuisance of himself could be 
silenced for the remainder of the debate by majority vote.  In the ensuing 
                                                                                                                          
88 Id.  For a summary of the tactics he employed, see id. at 142–43. 
89 Id. at 137; see also DOUGLAS DION, TURNING THE LEGISLATIVE THUMBSCREW: MINORITY 
RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL CHANGE IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 192 (1997) (“What then was so novel 
about Parnell’s behavior? . . . For the British, it was his willingness to obstruct all legislation, not just 
those dealing with the affairs of Ireland, that made him a legislative revolutionary.”); Rutherford, supra 
note 80, at 174 (“It was Parnell who employed parliamentary obstruction to block all government 
business so that Irish reform would be effected.  He was, indeed, as Redlich properly suggests, the real 
founder of wilful or conscious obstruction.”).  
90 235 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1877) 1814 (U.K.).  For background on the contempt power in 
the houses of Parliament, see generally CHAFETZ, supra note 48, at 193–206; Chafetz, Contempt, supra 
note 78, at 1093–1119. 
91 235 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1877) 1815 (U.K.).  
92 Id. at 1833.  
93 236 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1877) 80–82 (U.K.).  
94 Id. at 25.  
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debate, George Sandford proposed an amendment which would require a 
three-fourths vote to carry a motion prohibiting a Member from speaking.95  
Sir William Harcourt immediately stood to declare his opposition to 
supermajority voting rules: 
They never had such a Rule, and he was surprised that 
[Sandford], who wished to appear so very conservative of 
their Rules, should have proposed one of the most radical 
innovations of those Rules that had ever been attempted.  
There was nothing in that Resolution itself which was half so 
great a novelty as that Amendment.96 
Northcote, too, expressed his opposition to introducing supermajority 
rules,97 and it is telling that no Member came forward to suggest that there 
was any precedent whatsoever for such a rule.  In the end, Sandford’s 
amendment to the proposed resolution was voted down.98  As to the 
resolution itself, both Parnell and his obstructionist colleague Joseph 
Biggar insisted that they were not, in fact, obstructionists—that the 
resolution was (in Parnell’s words) an “unconstitutional” attempt “to 
muzzle him.”99  In other words, rather than defend a right to obstruct, they 
denied that their project was obstructionist at all.  Their colleagues in the 
House, however, were not buying it—especially after Northcote asked the 
Home Rulers “whether they can say conscientiously that all the opposition 
which they have conducted in the course of this Session has been of the 
character which [Parnell] describes?”100 and then proceeded to list acts of 
obstruction that could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be described 
as part of actual debate.101  Northcote’s resolution passed by a vote of 282 
to 32.102 
Northcote was still not done with Parnell.  In February of 1880, he 
proposed a new standing order of the House.103  Under this rule, the 
Speaker or Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House could declare 
that a Member was “disregarding the authority of the Chair, or abusing the 
Rules of the House by persistently and wilfully obstructing the business of 
                                                                                                                          
95 Id. at 34.  
96 Id. at 38.  
97 Id. at 68.  
98 Id. at 70.  
99 Id. at 54; see generally id. at 54–59 (reporting Parnell and Biggar’s speeches defending their 
actions). 
100 Id. at 66.  
101 See id. at 66–67.  
102 Id. at 80.  
103 A standing order continues from Parliament to Parliament unless repealed.  In contrast, a 
session rule—like the 1877 rules proposed by Northcote and adopted by the House—expires at the end 
of the parliamentary session.  See 2 REDLICH, supra note 79, at 6 (describing the difference between 
standing orders and session rules). 
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the House, or otherwise.”104  A non-debatable motion could then be made 
to suspend the named Member for the rest of the day.105  If a Member was 
suspended three times in a single parliamentary session, then the third 
suspension would last for a week, at which point the House would then 
vote on whether he could resume his seat or whether the suspension should 
continue.106  The House adopted Northcote’s proposed standing order by a 
vote of 166 to 20.107 
Nor did the fight over obstruction end with the demise of the Tory 
government in April 1880.  When Gladstone’s government brought in the 
Irish Coercion Bill in January of 1881, the Home Rulers reacted with forty-
one and a half hours of continuous obstruction.108  At this point, Speaker 
Brand had enough.  He declared that: 
A crisis has . . . arisen which demands the prompt 
interposition of the Chair, and of the House.  The usual rules 
have proved powerless to ensure orderly and effective 
Debate.  An important measure [i.e., the Coercion Bill], 
recommended in Her Majesty’s Speech nearly a month since, 
and declared to be urgent, in the interests of the State, by a 
decisive majority, is being arrested by the action of an 
inconsiderable minority, the Members of which have resorted 
to those modes of “Obstruction,” which have been recognised 
by the House as a Parliamentary offence. . . . 
A new and exceptional course is imperatively demanded; 
and I am satisfied that I shall best carry out the will of the 
House, and may rely upon its support, if I decline to call upon 
any more Members to speak, and at once proceed to put the 
Question from the Chair.109 
The question was thus put on the Coercion Bill, which passed decisively.110 
Perhaps most importantly of all, in 1882, the House adopted, on 
Gladstone’s motion, a closure procedure.  If the Speaker informed the 
House “that the subject has been adequately discussed,” then any Member 
could move to put the question.111  If that motion—which was non-
debatable—was supported by majority vote, then the question would be 
immediately put on the underlying matter.112  The procedure did require a 
                                                                                                                          
104 250 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1880) 1706 (U.K.).  
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 1708.  
108 1 REDLICH, supra note 79, at 153.  
109 257 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1881) 2032–33 (U.K.).  
110 Id. at 2035. 
111 137 H.C. JOUR. 505 (Nov. 10, 1882) (U.K.). 
112 Id.  
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larger-than-normal quorum (although the quorum threshold was still 
significantly less than half the membership of the House),113 but relied on a 
majority voting rule.  Moreover, the resolution creating the procedure was 
itself adopted by majority rule—and by a slim majority of 304 to 260, at 
that.114  Gladstone explicitly described the purpose of the procedure as the 
elimination of parliamentary obstruction, which he defined as “the 
disposition either of the minority of the House, or of individuals, to resist 
the prevailing will of the House otherwise than by argument.”115  And he 
reacted with horror to any suggestion that invoking closure should require 
a supermajority:  “God forbid that we should see so vast an innovation 
introduced into the practice of this House, applicable to our ordinary 
procedure, as would be a Rule of the House under which the voice of the 
majority was not to prevail over that of the minority.”116 
Let us briefly pause and take note of several important lessons of these 
debates over parliamentary obstruction.  First, there was widespread 
consensus that the tactics employed by Parnell and his Home Rule 
colleagues—that is, the indefinite obstruction of parliamentary business 
across a wide range of substantive areas—were something new in 
parliamentary history in the 1870s.  Moreover, neither Parnell nor Biggar 
was willing to stand up for a right to obstruct; instead, they both insisted 
that they were not engaged in obstructionism at all, but rather in ordinary 
debate.  Second, the reaction to the Home Rulers’ obstruction was swift 
and decisive, beginning with Speaker Brand’s 1877 announcement that 
obstruction was grounds for a contempt citation, and culminating in the 
1882 adoption of majority closure.  The instant that procedures were used 
for the purpose of obstruction, methods were found to curtail the 
obstructive uses of those procedures.  And third, Tories like Northcote and 
Liberals like Gladstone found common ground, not only in their 
determination to stop obstruction, but also in their revulsion to the idea of a 
supermajority rule for devices meant to curb obstruction.  In other words, 
none of the defining features of the modern filibuster find any support in 
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. (providing that the closure motion “shall not be decided in the Affirmative, if a Division be 
taken, unless it shall appear to have been supported by more than Two hundred Members, or unless it 
shall appear to have been opposed by less than Forty Members and supported by more than One 
hundred Members”).  
114 Id.  
115 266 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1882) 1140 (U.K.).  
116 Id. at 1146.  Gladstone focused on the inappropriateness of supermajority rules for ordinary 
procedure because he had, just the previous year, proposed a supermajority procedure for ending debate 
in extraordinary situations.  See 258 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1881) 103 (U.K.) (proposing the 
“urgency rule,” under which a three-quarters supermajority could sustain a motion from a member of 
the Government that pending business was urgent, after which the Speaker would have extensive 
powers to control debate on the urgent measure); id. at 155–56 (noting the passage of the urgency rule, 
as slightly amended).  Apparently, in Gladstone’s view, supermajority rules might be appropriate in 
extreme circumstances, but they certainly could not properly be introduced into everyday lawmaking 
procedures. 
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historic British parliamentary practice. 
Nor is the early history of Congress117 more favorable to filibuster 
proponents.  Jefferson, the great parliamentarian of the early Republic and 
President of the Senate from 1797 to 1801, wrote that “[n]o one is to speak 
impertinently or beside the question, superfluously or tediously.”118  
Jefferson anticipated that anyone violating this stricture could be called to 
order, and “[i]f repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call 
by his name any member obstinately persisting in irregularity, whereupon 
the house may require the member to withdraw.”119  The rules adopted by 
the first Senate provided that, “[w]hen a member shall be called to order, 
he shall sit down until the President shall have determined whether he is in 
order or not.”120  Moreover, those rules provided a mechanism for ending 
debate, in the form of a previous question motion;121 although the previous 
question was “originally intended to postpone discussion and thereby delay 
proceedings on a bill rather than end debate . . . [y]et on four occasions in 
the next seventeen years the previous question was used . . . to end 
debate.”122  True, the previous question motion was abolished in 1806—but 
this change was motivated not by a desire to eliminate restrictions on 
debate, but rather because of “the belief that the rule’s infrequent use made 
it unnecessary.”123 
Several scholars have insisted that a 1790 incident provides a historical 
pedigree for the filibuster,124 but a closer look at this incident demonstrates 
why it is inapt as a precedent for the sixty-vote Senate.  The issue was 
where the First Congress (then sitting in New York) should be located.  
The House had voted to locate Congress in Philadelphia,125 but the Senate 
refused to concur by a vote of thirteen to eleven.126  Samuel Johnston of 
North Carolina was so ill that he had to be brought to the Senate in his bed 
                                                                                                                          
117 Or, indeed, the history of pre-constitutional American legislatures.  See, e.g., MARY 
PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 178 n.21 (1943) 
(noting that “[l]ong or inappropriate speech was frowned upon in [the American colonies] as in 
England” and that the Pennsylvania colonial legislature even had a cloture rule).  
118 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 17, at 36 (Cosimo Classics 
2007) (1801).  
119 Id. at 38.  
120 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1789); see also Richard R. Beeman, Unlimited Debate in 
the Senate: The First Phase, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 419, 421 (1968) (noting that this rule constituted a 
“potential weapon against long-winded or improper debate”). 
121 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1789) (“The previous question being moved and 
seconded, the question from the Chair shall be: ‘Shall the main question be now put?’  And if the nays 
prevail, the main question shall not then be put.”).  
122 Beeman, supra note 120, at 421.  
123 Id.  
124 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 187 (“[T]he strategic use of delay in debate is as 
old as the Senate itself.  The first recorded episode of dilatory debate occurred in 1790, when [S]enators 
from Virginia and South Carolina filibustered to prevent the location of the first Congress in 
Philadelphia.”); Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 451 (quoting Fisk & Chemerinsky).  
125 H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 228–31 (1790). 
126 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 151–52 (1790).  
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in order to participate in this vote.127  Two days later, the House again took 
up a resolution calling for the next session of Congress to be located in 
Philadelphia.128  The issue was not resolved that day—accounts of the 
debate show Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and William Loughton 
Smith of South Carolina talking until the exhausted pro-Philadelphia forces 
finally consented to adjourn for the day.129  Fisher Ames, a House member 
from Massachusetts, explained the maneuvering in a letter to his friend 
Thomas Dwight: 
Yesterday it rained, and Governor Johns[t]on, who had been 
brought in a sick bed to vote in Senate against Philadelphia, 
could not be safely removed in the rain.  It was supposed, that 
if the resolve to remove could be urged through the House, 
and sent up while it continued raining, that it would pass in 
Senate.  They called for the question, but Gerry and Smith 
made long speeches and motions, so that the question was not 
decided till this morning.130 
Two things should stand out about this incident.  First, this was the use 
of a brief delay in the service of majoritarianism, not in derogation of it.  
After all, the Senate had already voted against Philadelphia; the pro-
Philadelphia forces in the House were hoping to take advantage of the bad 
weather and Senator Johnston’s ill health so that the pro-Philadelphia 
minority in the Senate could sneak one past the majority.  The delay lasted 
for less than a day, and it was designed to allow Senator Johnston to 
participate, and thus the majority in the Senate to have its way.  That is a 
far cry from the distinctly counter-majoritarian use of the filibuster in 
today’s Senate.  Second, the delay described above took place in the 
House, not the Senate.131  This is an important point, not simply because it 
                                                                                                                          
127 See The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates, in 9 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 286 (Kenneth R. 
Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (noting in a diary entry 
dated June 8, 1790 that “Izard & Butler actually went & brought Governor Johns[t]on with his night 
Cap on, out of bed. [sic] and a bed with him, the bed was deposited in the Committee room, Johns[t]on 
was brought in a Sedan” (alterations in original)).  
128 H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 237–38 (1790).  
129 See Debates in the House of Representatives: Second Session: April–August 1790, in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 127, at 1555 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994). 
130 Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (June 11, 1790), in 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 
WITH A SELECTION FROM HIS SPEECHES AND CORRESPONDENCE 79, 79–80 (Seth Ames ed., 1971) 
(1854).  
131 The main source on which Fisk and Chemerinsky rely gets this fact correct.  See FRANKLIN L. 
BURDETTE, FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE 14 (1940) (describing a “wrangle in the House which 
unquestionably bears the filibuster stamp” (emphasis added)).  But Fisk and Chemerinsky seem to have 
taken the fact that the filibuster was designed to protect the participation of an ill Senator as evidence 
that it took place in the Senate.  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 187–88.  And Gerhardt 
simply adopted Fisk and Chemerinsky’s description of the events.  See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 
8, at 264 (Gerhardt Closing Statement) (quoting Fisk & Chemerinsky); Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 451 
(same).  In earlier work, I, too, relied on the Fisk and Chemerinsky account without returning to the 
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deprives filibuster proponents of a valued First Congress precedent, but—
more importantly—because it points us toward the simple fact that “there 
was more obstruction in the House than the Senate from 1789 to 1901.”132  
Of course, today, we all know that minority obstruction in the House is 
nearly nonexistent; indeed, “[t]here is only one important rule in the 
House: the majority rules.”133  This should prove deeply unsettling to the 
standard filibuster narrative for two reasons: first, because it suggests that 
there is nothing structurally inevitable or historically mandated about the 
Senate’s role as the obstructionist house; and second, because, if the House 
can flip, surely the Senate can, too. 
Indeed, it is worth taking a closer look at the process by which the 
House flipped.  As Koger has demonstrated, the 1880s were marked by 
increasing obstruction in the House.  Koger describes the Fiftieth Congress 
(1887–1889), in which the Democrats had a slim majority, as “especially 
dysfunctional.”134  When the Fifty-First Congress convened in 1889, the 
Republicans had taken control, but they had an even slimmer majority, and 
they fully expected Democratic obstructionism.  When the Democrats 
refused to vote in the hopes of breaking a quorum, the new Speaker, 
Thomas Reed, operating at the beginning of the session under general 
parliamentary law,135 took notice from the chair of the presence of non-
voting Democrats.136  Reed announced from the chair that: 
The object of a parliamentary body is action, and not 
stoppage of action.  Hence, if any member or set of members 
undertakes to oppose the orderly progress of business, even 
by the use of the ordinarily recognized parliamentary 
motions, it is the right of the majority to refuse to have those 
motions entertained, and to cause the public business to 
proceed.137 
When frustrated Democrats appealed from Reed’s ruling to the floor of the 
House, the ruling was upheld by a vote of 163 to 0, with no Democrats 
voting and with Reed noting the presence of Democrats in order to make a 
                                                                                                                          
original sources.  See Chafetz & Gerhardt, supra note 8, at 250 (Chafetz Opening Statement) (citing 
Fisk & Chemerinsky); id. at 259–60 (Chafetz Closing Statement) (same).  Mea culpa. 
132 KOGER, supra note 11, at 39.  
133 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 20, at 83; see also id. at 90 (noting the sharp limits 
on dilatory tactics in the contemporary House). 
134 KOGER, supra note 11, at 53.  
135 21 CONG. REC. 996 (1890) (Speaker Reed announcing that the rules of the House are “the rules 
which govern every parliamentary assembly”).  On the use of general parliamentary law at the 
beginning of a new Congress, see 5 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES §§ 6761–63, at 888–89 (1907). 
136 See 21 CONG. REC. 997, 998, 1000 (1890); see also GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789–1994, H.R. DOC. NO. 103-324, at 181–82 (1994) 
(noting Reed’s war on the disappearing quorum).  
137 21 CONG. REC. 999 (1890).  
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quorum.138  A couple of weeks later, the House adopted a package of 
permanent rules codifying Reed’s rulings from the Chair.139  The two 
central planks of the “Reed Rules” were the ability to prevent disappearing 
quorums by taking note of members present but not voting, and the ability 
of the chair to ignore motions and appeals made solely for the purpose of 
delay, even if they were otherwise in order.140 
The 1890 elections were not kind to the Republicans, and the Fifty-
Second Congress assembled with a significant Democratic majority.  Part 
of the Democrats’ electoral platform had consisted of criticizing the 
Republicans’ rulemaking innovations,141 and the Democrats quickly 
reversed the Reed Rules.142  But three years in power were enough to 
convince the Democrats that the Republicans had the right idea in the first 
place;143 in 1894, the House re-adopted the Reed Rules,144 and the Reed 
Rules’ “goals and principles have remained deeply embedded in the 
proceedings of the House of Representatives ever since.”145  In short, the 
trajectory of the House of Representatives is very much like that of the 
House of Commons: when normal parliamentary tactics were turned into 
regular weapons of permanent minority obstruction, the rules were 
changed—by majority vote and in the middle of a legislative session—to 
eliminate the obstruction.146 
Meanwhile, the combination of its small size, relatively small 
workload, and use of attrition as a response to dilatory tactics meant that 
permanent obstruction in the Senate in this period was almost unknown.  
Koger does not identify a Senate filibuster occurring until 1831,147 and they 
remained relatively rare throughout the nineteenth century.148  Moreover, 
for most of this time, the absence of formal limits on Senate debate did not 
operate as a standing minority veto.  As Fisk and Chemerinsky note, 
“almost every filibustered measure before 1880 was eventually passed.”149  
                                                                                                                          
138 Id. at 1000.  
139 Id. at 1347.  
140 See GALLOWAY, supra note 136, at 182.  
141 See KOGER, supra note 11, at 55.  
142 Id.  
143 In a perverse twist, some of the intervening time was taken up with a Republican filibuster 
mounted as an attempt to force the Democrats to reinstate the Reed Rules.  “For months, the Democrats 
were so committed to minority rights that they endured delay, defeat, and embarrassment rather than 
empower themselves.  After seven and a half months, the Republicans got their wish: the Democrats 
proposed a rule depriving them of their filibustering tactics.”  Id.  
144 See 26 CONG. REC. 3786–92 (1894); KOGER, supra note 11, at 55.  
145 GALLOWAY, supra note 136, at 182.  
146 See KOGER, supra note 11, at 95 (“The historic House provides an interesting case study of the 
life cycle of obstruction: initially obstruction is possible but rare, then it is frequent, then a majority 
imposes dramatic reforms, then obstruction is rare again.”). 
147 Id. at 62.  
148 See id. at 60 fig.4.3.  
149 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 195; see also KOGER, supra note 11, at 60 fig.4.3 
(demonstrating this point in graphic form). 
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During this period, the undisputed master of dilatory tactics was John C. 
Calhoun, who repeatedly used the tactic in an attempt to protect the 
interests of the Southern states.150  As the congressional workload began to 
increase in the aftermath of the Civil War, the cost of waiting out a 
filibuster correspondingly rose.  By the early twentieth century, “[S]enators 
and the public alike perceived filibustering to be a serious problem.”151  It 
is, then, unsurprising that the Senate’s first cloture rule—requiring a two-
thirds vote to cut off debate—was adopted in 1917, in the aftermath of a 
filibuster that killed a bill that would have armed merchant ships against 
German U-boat attacks.152  
Even with such a high cloture threshold, filibustering for most of the 
twentieth century was reserved for issues of especially intense 
preferences—and, for the most part, it was reserved specifically for civil 
rights bills.153  Strom Thurmond infamously spoke continuously for 
twenty-four hours and eighteen minutes as part of a filibuster against the 
1957 Civil Rights Act.154  And, of course, the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
occupied the Senate continuously from February 17 to June 19 of that year 
(cloture had been invoked on June 10).155  During that debate, Thurmond 
limited himself to a modest five-hour-and-forty-minute performance.156  In 
subsequent years, Southern Senators mounted filibusters against the 1965 
Voting Rights Act, the 1968 Fair Housing Act, the 1970 Voting Rights Act 
reauthorization, and the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act.157 
As use of the filibuster became more common (and less tethered to 
civil rights) in the 1970s,158 pressure mounted for reform.  The result was 
the lowering of the cloture threshold to sixty votes in 1975,159 as well as 
the development of the “tracking” system.160  And, as we have seen, from 
there, the filibuster began to turn into the sixty-vote requirement that we 
                                                                                                                          
150 See Beeman, supra note 120, at 421–31; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 189–92.  
151 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 195.  
152 See id. at 196–98.  
153 See id. at 199 (“During a forty year period from the late 1920s until the late 1960s, the 
filibuster became almost entirely associated with the battle over civil rights.”); see also KOGER, supra 
note 11, at 116–24 (describing the civil rights filibusters and noting that Southern success generally 
resulted from their greater intensity of effort).  
154 CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 143 (1985).  
155 For a full account of the Senate debate, see generally id. at 124–217.  
156 Id. at 145.  
157 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 200.  
158 See KOGER, supra note 11, at 107 fig.6.3 (showing the increase in filibustering in the early 
1970s); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 201 (noting that filibustering became less tied to civil 
rights around that same time).  
159 See KOGER, supra note 11, at 176 (noting that the Senate revised Rule XXII to require a three-
fifths majority for cloture).  
160 See supra text accompanying notes 38–40 (explaining the “tracking” system and describing its 
effects on the filibuster).  
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know today.161 
This historical treatment has necessarily been truncated, but it should 
be enough to make several points clear.  First, filibuster proponents are 
simply mistaken when they assert that the filibuster has a long and 
distinguished pedigree.  In fact, the history of the House of Commons, the 
House of Representatives, and the Senate itself show precisely the 
opposite: when ordinary procedures began to be used for the purpose of 
indefinite minority obstruction, those procedures were reformed in order to 
eliminate that obstruction.  Perhaps the Senate in 2011 is simply where the 
House of Commons was in 1877, and where the House of Representatives 
was in 1890.  Moreover, the fact that obstruction was more prevalent in the 
House for the first century of the Republic should put to rest any claim that 
a right to obstruct is somehow built into the Senate’s design.  Supporters of 
today’s sixty-vote Senate simply cannot find substantial justification in the 
institution’s history. 
And what historical precedents there are for minority obstruction are 
ones that they ought to be hesitant to claim.  After all, the two great 
filibusterers in American history were John C. Calhoun and Strom 
Thurmond—the great champions of slavery and segregation, respectively.  
While the morality of a tactic is generally divorceable from the morality of 
the cause in which it is employed, arguments from historical pedigree must 
take the entire historical record into account.  And I would submit that the 
great obstructionists in the history of the American Senate have a 
precedential status more anti-canonical than canonical, more Plessy than 
Brown.162 
C.  The Counterargument from the Acceptability of Legislative 
Entrenchment 
The final category of counterarguments to the unconstitutionality of 
the filibuster, as described above, sounds in structural reasoning.  
Specifically, this line of counterarguments, following an important article 
by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule,163 argues that there is simply “no 
rationale to be found” for the traditional rule against legislative 
entrenchment.164  If Posner and Vermeule are correct, then the particular 
form of entrenchment embodied in the filibuster165 is likewise 
                                                                                                                          
161 See supra Part II.B (describing the actual operation of the filibuster).  
162 On reasoning from anti-canons, see J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The 
Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018–21 (1998); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 
125 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776488; Richard A. 
Primus, Essay, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 252–64 (1998). 
163 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 
YALE L.J. 1665 (2002).  
164 Id. at 1666. 
165 See supra Part III (arguing that the filibuster impermissibly entrenches the status quo).  
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unobjectionable.166 
I do not, however, think that Posner and Vermeule are correct.167  They 
make two broad arguments that are relevant to our discussion here.  First, 
they assert that constitutional text, history, and structure provide no 
grounds for objection to legislative entrenchment,168 and second, they 
argue that objections premised on “simple, time-bound majoritarianism” 
are incoherent.169  I will address each in turn. 
First, it is not clear that Posner and Vermeule actually have the better 
of the historical argument.  The canonical sources on English law certainly 
support a constitutional principle against legislative entrenchment.  Francis 
Bacon insisted that an attempt “by a precedent act of Parliament to bind or 
frustrate a future” was “illusory,” as “a supreme and absolute power cannot 
conclude itself, neither can that which is in nature revocable be made 
fixed.”170  Coke, in a section headed “Acts against the power of the 
Parliament subsequent bind not,”171 wrote that, although 
divers Parliaments have attempted to barre, restrain, suspend, 
qualifie, or make void subsequent Parliaments, yet could they 
never effect it, for the latter Parliament hath ever power to 
abrogate, suspend, qualifie, explain, or make void the former 
in the whole or in any part thereof, notwithstanding any 
words of restraint, prohibition, or penalty in the former: for it 
is a maxime in the law of the Parliament, quod leges 
posteriors priores contrarias abrogant.172 
Petyt quoted this passage from Coke in its entirety,173 and, indeed, listed 
“abrogateth old Laws” first among the powers of Parliament.174  And 
Blackstone wrote that:  
Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent 
parliaments bind not. . . . Because the legislature, being in 
                                                                                                                          
166 See Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 464–70 (relying on Posner and Vermeule to argue that there is 
no constitutional problem with the entrenchment created by the filibuster).  
167 Others have responded to Posner and Vermeule’s arguments in more detail than space permits 
me here.  See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Essay, Symmetric Entrenchment: 
A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003); John C. Roberts & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Essay, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and 
Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773 (2003). 
168 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1673–85.  
169 See id. at 1685–88.  
170 FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry 
Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622).  
171 EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 42 
(Garland Publ’g 1979) (1644).  
172 Id. at 43.  
173 GEORGE PETYT, LEX PARLIAMENTARIA, OR, A TREATISE OF THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF 
PARLIAMENTS 77–78 (London, J. Stagg, 2d ed. 1690).  
174 Id. at 69; see also id. at 71–72 (insisting that Parliament always retains full power to “abrogate, 
adnul, amplifie, or diminish” any laws that it chooses).  
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truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of 
absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, 
which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances 
could bind the present parliament.175   
Posner and Vermeule mention Bacon only in a footnote176 and do not 
mention Coke or Petyt at all; they dismiss Blackstone’s comment because 
it occurs in a section devoted to “the construction of statutes,”177 which, 
they suggest, does not speak “to the constitutional question about 
intertemporal choice-of-law.”178  But this misunderstands the nature of the 
British Constitution, in which “the actual, current structure of institutions is 
constitutive of the Constitution itself.”179  In Britain, a principle of 
statutory construction is not so neatly separable from a constitutional 
principle.  Certainly, Dicey thought he was stating a central constitutional 
principle when he wrote that “there is no law which Parliament cannot 
change.”180  True, Dicey acknowledged that language in certain statutes 
gave the impression of permanence,181 but he argued that these passages 
were mere rhetorical flourishes, without any legal effect.182  Posner and 
Vermeule suggest that Dicey had it backwards and that these passages 
should be seen instead as “highly successful entrenchments.”183  But 
longevity is not the same as entrenchment—laws may simply last because 
people like them.  (Consider that the 1351 Treason Act184 is still in force,185 
although it does not purport to entrench itself.)  Indeed, as Dicey notes, the 
Act of Union with Scotland has been repeatedly amended, despite its 
claims of self-entrenchment.186  And the Act of Union with Ireland—which 
likewise purported to be perpetual—died shortly before Dicey himself did, 
with Parliament’s ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921.187  In 
                                                                                                                          
175 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90.  
176 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1665 n.4.  
177 BLACKSTONE, supra note 175, at *87. 
178 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1677.  
179 CHAFETZ, supra note 48, at 1; see also Josh Chafetz, Book Review, Multiplicity in Federalism 
and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1115 (2011). 
180 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37 (Liberty 
Classics 1982) (8th ed. 1915).  
181 See, e.g., Act of Union, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67, art. I (joining Great Britain and Ireland 
“for ever after . . . into one kingdom, by the name of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland”); Act of Union, 1707, 6 Anne, c. 11, art. I (joining England and Scotland “for ever after . . . 
into One Kingdom by the Name of Great Britain”). 
182 See DICEY, supra note 180, at 21–23.  
183 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1678.  
184 Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2.  
185 See O. HOOD PHILLIPS ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 299 (8th ed. 
2001) (noting that the 1351 Act, with amendments, is still in force). 
186 See DICEY, supra note 180, at 21–22.  
187 On the Anglo-Irish Treaty, see Ronald A. Christaldi, Comment, The Shamrock and the Crown: 
A Historic Analysis of the Framework Document and Prospects for Peace in Ireland, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 123, 151 (1995).  On the date of Dicey’s death, see Roger E. Michener, Foreword to 
DICEY, supra note 180, at xi, xi. 
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short, the overwhelming authority—both at the time of the American 
Founding and subsequently188—supported the proposition that a Parliament 
could not bind future Parliaments. 
The American history suggests that the same principle was understood 
to hold on this side of the Atlantic.  Consider the 1786 Virginia Statute on 
Religious Freedom, drafted by Jefferson and shepherded through the state 
legislature by Madison.189  The Statute concludes with the following 
paragraph: 
And though we well know that this assembly elected by the 
people for the ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no 
power to restrain the acts of succeeding assemblies, 
constituted with powers equal to our own, and that therefore 
to declare this act to be irrevocable would be of no effect in 
law; yet we are free to declare, and do declare, that the rights 
hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind . . . .190 
This paragraph is clearly intended to be declaratory of a widely recognized 
preexisting principle.  Indeed, it is a statement against interest,191 for surely 
the legislature would have liked to make this declaration of the “natural 
rights of mankind” unrepealable; the Virginians understood, however, that 
a basic principle of Anglo-American constitutionalism made them unable 
to do so. 
Hamilton, too, recognized this principle, writing in The Federalist No. 
78 that, when two statutes conflict, “[t]he rule which has obtained in the 
courts for determining their relative validity is that the last in order of time 
shall be preferred to the first.”192  Hamilton went on to write that “this is a 
mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law but from the 
nature and reason of the thing.”193  Posner and Vermeule seize on this latter 
sentence, arguing that Hamilton meant that this “mere rule of construction” 
was applicable only “when the relevant statutes are silent about their 
relative priority.”194  But Hamilton’s claim must be read in context:  He is 
defending judicial review against the argument that it violates the last-in-
                                                                                                                          
188 Cf. Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. Liverpool Corp., (1931) 1 K.B. 733 at 743 (U.K.) (Avory, J.) 
(“[W]e are asked to say that by a provision of this Act of 1919 the hands of Parliament were tied in 
such a way that it could not by any subsequent Act enact anything which was inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Act of 1919.  It must be admitted that such a suggestion as that is inconsistent with 
the principle of the constitution of this country.”); id. at 745–46 (Humphreys, J.) (describing the 
principle that a 1919 Act trumps a 1925 Act as “an astonishing proposition”).  
189 See 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 73–74 (Melvin I. 
Urofsky & Paul Finkelman eds., 2d ed. 2002) (briefly describing the Statute’s history). 
190 Id. at 74–75 (reprinting the Statute).  
191 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (recognizing that statements against interest are generally 
considered reliable).  
192 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
193 Id.  
194 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1677.  
 1032 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1003 
time rule.195  Just as “the nature and reason of the thing” dictate that the 
more recent statute controls the older one, so too they require that “the 
prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an 
inferior and subordinate authority.”196  It should not pass without notice 
that Hamilton repeats the phrase “the nature and reason of the thing” in 
both instances:  Just as the Constitution’s status as higher law naturally 
and reasonably means that it takes precedence over statutes, so too when 
legal provisions partake of the same level of authority, they naturally and 
reasonably should be interpreted according to the last-in-time rule.  
Nothing in The Federalist No. 78 even remotely suggests that Congress 
could choose to give an ordinary statute priority over any later statute.  
Indeed, the nature and reason of the thing suggest otherwise. 
Posner and Vermeule, then, are left with a single piece of evidence 
suggesting Founding-era support for legislative entrenchment: a letter that 
Madison wrote to Jefferson in February of 1790,197 responding to 
Jefferson’s famous insistence that all laws—including the Constitution—
should expire every nineteen years.198  In response, Madison divided the 
“Acts of a political society” into three categories: 
1. the fundamental constitution of the Government 
2. laws involving some stipulation, which renders them 
     irrevocable at the will of the Legislature 
3. laws involving no such irrevocable quality.199 
Posner and Vermeule regard the inclusion of the second category as 
evidence that “Madison himself recognized the validity of entrenching 
statutes.”200  But the only example Madison gives of a political act falling 
into this second category is the creation of public debt.201  As McGinnis 
and Rappaport note, legislation creating vested property rights is a special 
category, as the Constitution itself—through the Contracts Clause, the 
Takings Clause, and the Due Process Clauses—suggests a special 
                                                                                                                          
195 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 192, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton). 
196 Id. (emphasis added).   
197 Two versions of Madison’s letter exist, although the revisions are “all stylistic and do not 
affect the substance of the ideas expressed.”  Editorial Note, in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: 
CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 18 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981) [hereinafter 
MADISON PAPERS].  I shall therefore quote from the later, revised version, as I take it to be Madison’s 
more considered phrasing. 
198 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1788–1792, at 121 (G.P. Putnam & Sons ed., 1895) (“Every constitution then, 
and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. . . .”). 
199 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Revised Text) (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13 
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 197, at 22. 
200 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1677.  
201 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 199, at 23.  
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solicitude for vested property rights.202  Indeed, a better gauge of 
Madison’s views on ordinary legislation is probably from a debate in the 
House of Representatives, several months after his exchange with 
Jefferson, on the location of the national capital.203  The bill under 
consideration would move the capital to Philadelphia for ten years, while 
Washington was being built.  In response to fears that Philadelphia would 
subsequently convince Congress to make it the permanent capital, Madison 
shrugged: 
It is said that before the ten years expire a repeal of the 
act may take place, and thus Congress be kept at 
Philadelphia.  But what more can we do than pass a law for 
the purpose?  It is not in our power to guard against a 
repeal—our acts are not like those of the Medes and Persians, 
unalterable.  A repeal is a thing against which no provision 
can be made.  If that is an objection, it holds good against any 
law that can be passed.  If those states that may have a 
superiority in Congress at a future day, will pay no respect to 
the acts of their predecessors or to the public good, there is 
no power to compel them.204 
This would be hard to square with a general belief in the permissibility of 
legislative entrenchment.205  The American history, like the British, thus 
evinces a strongly anti-entrenchment view. 
But what about Posner and Vermeule’s structural argument that 
objections to entrenchment are simply incoherent?  First, they insist that 
legislative entrenchments do not really reduce the power of future 
legislatures:  “The mistake here is the . . . premise that ‘the subjects of 
legislation’ remain the same over time.  In fact, new issues arise with 
changes in technology, society, and politics, so that the later legislature 
will always have the opportunity to address policy questions that earlier 
legislatures could not have envisioned.”206  But this is far too blasé about 
the perennial subjects of legislation.  True, legislative entrenchment may 
never reach the stage where subsequent Congresses are the equivalent of 
                                                                                                                          
202 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 167, at 404.  In a new article, Chris Serkin also focuses 
on the ways in which governments—especially local governments—can entrench policy positions by 
creating property rights.  See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding 
Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at Part II) (copy on file with 
author). 
203 This is, indeed, a continuation of the debate the beginning of which is described supra text 
accompanying notes 124–30. 
204 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 127, at 1648. 
205 Note, again, that this is a statement against interest, as Madison sought the bill’s passage.  He 
might have won over some of its opponents if he could have promised that Philadelphia would not be 
made the permanent capital.  He knew, however, that he could not.  See supra note 191 and 
accompanying text (noting the special reliability of statements against interest).  
206 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1676 n.31.  
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the Chiltern Hundreds,207 mere offices without responsibility,208 but some 
of the most important issues will always be with us.  Consider a law setting 
the highest marginal income tax rate at ten percent.  Now, assume that this 
law also contains an entrenching provision, requiring a unanimous vote to 
change it in any way.  Surely, subsequent Congresses have significantly 
less actual power than the Congress that passed this law did.209  And this is 
true (albeit to a lesser extent) if the entrenchment requires a mere sixty 
percent supermajority to change the law, rather than unanimity. 
Here is where Posner and Vermeule’s argument about the incoherence 
of “simple, time-bound majoritarianism” comes in.  They will reply that, 
yes, in a functional sense, the later Congress has lost some power in the 
example described above.  But, they will say, this is true even if the tax law 
can be changed by simple majority vote.  That is because all legislation 
entrenches.  In their words, “[i]f there are political or logistical costs to 
repealing legislation—and there surely are—then an earlier Congress 
‘binds’ a later Congress by enacting legislation that cannot be costlessly 
repealed or changed . . . .”210  And if legislation inevitably entrenches, then 
it is simply incoherent to object to “legislative entrenchment.”  But this is 
something of a reductio ad absurdum.  To see why, consider an analogous 
argument: almost all legislation burdens speech.211  Surely, this does not 
mean that the prohibition on laws “abridging the freedom of speech”212 is 
incoherent.  Rather, it must be understood in some other way.  The same is 
true for the argument against legislative entrenchment:  if we understand it 
as a principle that any law that constrains future choices is invalid, then it 
is nonsensical for precisely the reason that Posner and Vermeule identify.  
But the principle against legislative entrenchment is best understood, not as 
arguing that any Congress must be able to bring about any state of the 
world that it wishes, but rather as arguing that any Congress must be able 
to pass any piece of legislation that it wishes.213  Of course, the current 
                                                                                                                          
207 See Chafetz, Resignation, supra note 78, at 192–95 (describing the Chiltern Hundreds). 
208 But see G.K. CHESTERTON, ALARMS AND DISCURSIONS 155–59 (1910) (describing 
Chesterton’s fantasy of running for Parliament, taking the Chiltern Hundreds, and then demanding to 
exercise the duties of the office). 
209 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 167, at 415 n.108 (describing Posner and Vermeule’s 
description of formal legislative equality as “weak and idiosyncratic”).  
210 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1686.  
211 Taxes take my money, leaving me with fewer resources to devote to speech.  Property rights 
exclude me from areas in which I might want to speak.  The decision to build a courthouse instead of a 
public park leaves fewer spaces in which I can freely speak to large groups of people.  Etc.  See, e.g., 
MICHAEL C. DORF & TREVOR W. MORRISON, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163 (2010) (“[I]f taken to the extreme, of course, nearly any government action 
can be construed as restricting some activity or item that is needed to facilitate speech.”).  
212 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
213 See Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 1798 (“The difference is between a law that 
can be changed through the usual legislative process and a law that cannot.  Countless factors may 
influence whether a legislature acts or not, but that does not mean that each of them equally restricts 
legislative action. . . . [E]ntrenchment is different because it places formal, binding obstacles in the path 
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state of the world will very much factor into its calculus about whether it 
wishes to pass a certain piece of legislation.  A city council’s decision at 
time T1 to build a municipal building on a vacant lot will undoubtedly 
create a state of the world in which it is much more difficult for the council 
at time T2 to turn that same lot into a park.  But the fact that the state of the 
world inevitably conditions legislative incentives does not mean that it 
must therefore be unobjectionable to allow the legislature at T1 to prohibit 
the legislature at T2 from repealing or amending a law that the T2 
legislature—given the state of the world at T2—wishes to repeal.  In other 
words, the fact that the council can build a building on the lot does not 
mean that it can also prevent any future legislature from tearing down the 
building and putting in a park, should that future legislature wish to expend 
the resources and political capital to do so. 
In responding to Posner and Vermeule’s arguments, I have not made 
an affirmative case that legislative entrenchment is unconstitutional.  
Others have made those arguments,214 and rehearsing them is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  But given that—as Posner and Vermeule themselves 
recognize—the rule against legislative entrenchment is orthodoxy,215 it 
seems reasonable to put the burden of proof on them.  Moreover, the 
orthodox position simply fits better with our ordinary structural 
intuitions—could it really be the case that Congress could pass an 
unrepealable law?216  And if not—that is, if our intuition that legislative 
entrenchment is impermissible is correct—then the special subset of 
legislative entrenchment that is the filibuster must also be impermissible. 
V.  GETTING RID OF THE FILIBUSTER 
Okay, let’s assume you’re still with me.  That is to say, let’s suppose 
that you think I have accurately described the contemporary filibuster (Part 
II), demonstrated its unconstitutionality (Part III), and adequately rebutted 
the various counterarguments (Part IV).  What is to be done about it?  This 
Part will answer that question by considering which institutional actor can 
get rid of the filibuster, when it can do so, and what might replace it. 
                                                                                                                          
of current majorities seeking to perform their legislative responsibilities.”); id. at 1816–18 (arguing that 
what distinguishes actual legislative entrenchment from the “binding” effects of facts on the ground is 
that the latter can be overcome by a determined legislative majority).  
214 See generally Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 167.  
215 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 163, at 1665–66; see also Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra 
note 167, at 1775–76. 
216 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 167, at 387 (noting that Posner and Vermeule “never 
directly discuss the radical laws and measures their approach would allow”); Roberts & Chemerinsky, 
supra note 167, at 1776 (noting that Posner and Vermeule “fail to address fully the practical realities of 
their proposal”). 
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A.  The Who 
The judiciary is (rightly) impotent in the face of the filibuster for two 
reasons.  First, cameral rules are nonjusticiable political questions.217  But 
second, even supposing that a court were willing to hear the claim, and 
even supposing that it found that someone had standing to bring the suit, 
there is no one who could properly be named as the defendant.  The 
Speech or Debate Clause218 would require that the case be dismissed as 
against any Senators who were named as defendants.219  Who would be left 
to sue? 
Some might be led astray by Powell v. McCormack,220 but a closer 
examination of that case shows why it is disanalogous.  In that case, Adam 
Clayton Powell and thirteen of his constituents sued John McCormak, the 
Speaker of the House, five individual members of the House, and the 
Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Doorkeeper of the House.221  The plaintiffs 
asserted that Powell had been unconstitutionally excluded from the 90th 
Congress; therefore, they claimed, it was actionable when “the Clerk of the 
House threatened to refuse to perform the service for Powell to which a 
duly elected Congressman is entitled, . . . the Sergeant at Arms refused to 
pay Powell his salary, and . . . the Doorkeeper threatened to deny Powell 
admission to the House chamber.”222  The Supreme Court held that the 
case must be dismissed as against all of the defendants who were members 
of the House, but that it could continue as against all of the defendants who 
were not.223  So, in our hypothetical suit to have the filibuster declared 
unconstitutional, who would take the place of the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, 
or Doorkeeper?  After all, no one is seeking access to the floor, nor is 
anyone seeking back pay or any of the other ministerial services that non-
member officers of the chamber perform.  Instead, our hypothetical 
plaintiffs would be seeking the use of different cameral rules—and 
determination of cameral rules falls squarely within the purview of the 
Senators themselves.224  It would be tempting to suggest the Senate 
Parliamentarian as the proper defendant, but the Parliamentarian’s role is 
purely advisory—even if he could be ordered by a court to recommend a 
certain ruling to the presiding officer, the presiding officer always has the 
                                                                                                                          
217 See CHAFETZ, supra note 48, at 57–59. 
218 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and 
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”).  
219 See generally CHAFETZ, supra note 48, at 87–110 (discussing the history, meaning, and scope 
of the Speech or Debate Clause).  
220 395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
221 Id. at 493.  
222 Id.  
223 Id. at 501–06; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 48, at 97 (discussing this holding of Powell).  
224 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (Rules of Proceedings Clause). 
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discretion to rule differently.225  And, as the presiding officer is always a 
member or the Vice President, she would be protected from suit by the 
Speech or Debate Clause. 
There are thus at least two independent reasons why a lawsuit seeking 
to get rid of the filibuster would be a non-starter.  First, it would be 
nonjusticiable; and second, there would be no one who could properly be 
named as a defendant.  The claim that the filibuster is unconstitutional 
must therefore be addressed to the Senators themselves.  Senators, after all, 
take the same oath “to support this Constitution” that judges do,226 and we 
should not presume that they take that oath any more lightly than judges 
do.  The arguments here, then, are addressed to the constitutionally 
conscientious Senator.227 
B.  The When 
The question of timing is also relevant:  When is the proper time to 
make this argument before the Senate?  Many have argued that the 
beginning of a new Congress is the proper time to do so.  The claim runs 
something like this: As noted in Part II, one of the ways in which the 
filibuster entrenches itself is by requiring an even higher threshold—two-
thirds of the Senators present and voting—for achieving cloture on a 
motion to amend the rules.  And because the Senate is considered a 
“continuing body,” the rules never expire on their own.  Therefore, 
according to the rules themselves, the cloture threshold can never be 
lowered without a two-thirds supermajority.228 
But Aaron Bruhl has recently launched a detailed and sophisticated 
attack on the idea of the Senate as a “continuing body.”229  If Bruhl is 
correct, then the Senate must be free to adopt new rules at the beginning of 
each Congress, just as the House does.  Moreover, the vote to adopt the 
new rules would occur under “general parliamentary law”230—under which 
the majority rules.231  The Senate could thus adopt whatever rules it 
wanted, by majority vote, every two years.  These rules might include a 
supermajority cloture mechanism, but that mechanism would be less 
entrenched than it currently is, because it would be subject to majoritarian 
revision every two years. 
                                                                                                                          
225 See MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 11 (2d ed. 2008) (“It is often 
misstated that the parliamentarian makes rulings.  The presiding officer rules after having received the 
parliamentarian’s counsel. . . . [T]he presiding officer has the power to ignore the parliamentarian’s 
advice . . . .”).  
226 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  
227 Cf. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).  
228 See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
229 See generally Bruhl, supra note 22 (critiquing the continuing body theory).  
230 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.  
231 See Bruhl, supra note 22, at 1459–60.  
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I would argue, however, that the proper time for filibuster reform is 
any time.  If I am correct that the current sixty-vote Senate is 
unconstitutional, then the Senate rules, as applied to create this 
circumstance, are void.  That is to say, just as “a legislative act contrary to 
the constitution is not law,”232 so too a resolution contrary to the 
Constitution cannot create a binding cameral rule.233  This would mean 
that, at any time, a member could move to amend the Senate rules and 
lower the cloture threshold.  Presumably, the minority would begin to 
filibuster the motion.  The sponsors of the motion would then have two 
options.  They could seek cloture on their motion.  Suppose, then, that 
more than half but fewer than two-thirds of the Senators present and voting 
vote to invoke cloture.  Under the Senate rules as written, cloture would 
therefore fail.234  But instead, the presiding officer announces that the 
motion has passed, on the grounds that Rule XXII is unconstitutional 
insofar as it requires a supermajority to invoke cloture on a motion to 
amend the rules—that is, he buys the argument I laid out in Part III.  And 
because the Rule is unconstitutional, it does not bind him.  The presiding 
officer’s ruling is immediately appealed to the Senate as a whole, where it 
is sustained by majority vote.235  Cloture has now been achieved on the 
motion to amend the rules, and the motion proceeds to a vote.  If it receives 
a majority, then the Senate rules have been amended.236  Alternatively, the 
sponsors of the motion to amend the rules could raise a point of order and 
argue that the filibusterers were engaging in dilatory tactics and were 
therefore out of order.237  The presiding officer would find the filibusterers 
out of order—a finding that would be upheld by majority vote—and the 
underlying motion could then pass by majority vote.  There is no reason 
that either of these routes would require waiting until the beginning of a 
new Congress. 
Of course, another possibility is that a supermajority of Senators come 
to accept the argument that the filibuster is unconstitutional and, taking 
                                                                                                                          
232 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
233 It is important to note here that this is a legal argument.  I am not making the claim that a 
majority of the Senate, by the application of brute force, could displace legitimate rules; rather, I am 
arguing that the rules they would be displacing are unconstitutional and therefore illegitimate.  To use a 
familiar analogue, when a court (properly) strikes down a law as unconstitutional, it is not exercising 
brute force in contravention of law; it is, instead, applying higher law to displace ordinary law.  The 
Senate, here, would be doing precisely the same thing. 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
235 RIDDICK, supra note 14, at 115 (noting that appeals from rulings from the chair are decided by 
majority vote). 
236 For a more detailed discussion of this tactic and its pedigree, see Martin B. Gold & Dimple 
Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to 
Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 217–60 (2004). 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 90, 94, 104–107, 109–110, 118–120, 135–140 (noting that 
dilatory tactics have been found to be out of order in the House of Commons, the House of 
Representatives, and the Senate).  
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their oath seriously, vote to change the Senate rules.  As Gold and Gupta 
have noted, Senators’ constitutional consciences can be pricked by the 
threat of a majoritarian determination that the current rules are 
unconstitutional.238 
C.  The What 
Having argued that only the Senate can get rid of the filibuster and that 
it can do so at any time, one question remains: What, exactly, must be 
gotten rid of, and what, exactly, can replace it?  Must the Senate become 
simply a smaller version of the House, in which the majority can almost 
always be assured of the nearly instantaneous implementation of its will?  I 
have already suggested that the Senate need not follow that course.  Recall 
that the constitutional principle for which I have argued is simply that a 
determined and focused legislative majority must be able to get its way in a 
reasonable amount of time.239 
Obviously, majority cloture—that is, debate can be cut off by majority 
vote—is consistent with this principle.  But Senators may rightly feel wary 
of instituting majority cloture.  After all, the Senate certainly has a tradition 
of robust debate, and perhaps there is a real fear that majority cloture 
would too often be used to limit actual debate, as opposed to obstruction.  
Moreover, there may be some deliberative value in allowing for certain 
forms of “soft” obstructionism.  That is, perhaps measures supported by 
more than half but less than three-fifths of the members are contentious 
enough that debate on those measures should be slowed down, so as to 
allow more time for reflection and persuasion.  This “soft” obstruction 
would look a lot more like nineteenth-century filibusters.240  Again, so long 
as a determined and focused legislative majority could get its way in a 
reasonable amount of time, I do not see any constitutional problem with 
“soft” obstruction. 
So, are there any reform possibilities which might assuage Senators’ 
fears about majority cloture while still conforming to the constitutional 
principle laid out above?  I think there are several, including: non-
entrenched supermajority cloture (that is, a supermajority is required to 
achieve cloture, but the supermajority rule can be changed by majority 
vote); a suspensory filibuster (that is, a minority can delay but not 
permanently defeat a majority proposal);241 or a declining filibuster (that is, 
                                                                                                                          
238 Gold & Gupta, supra note 236, at 260 (noting that, “on at least four occasions,” changes to 
Senate rules that passed with supermajoritarian support “were forced by attempts to use the 
constitutional option”).  
239 See supra text accompanying notes 63–70. 
240 See supra text accompanying note 149.  
241 For more on this idea, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 317–23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564747 (arguing 
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after debate on a measure began, the number of votes needed for cloture 
would slowly decline until a bare majority sufficed).242  Each of these has 
arguments to recommend it, and I would think that a constitutionally 
conscientious Senator could justify supporting any of them.  A 
constitutionally conscientious Senator cannot, however, justify supporting 
the status quo. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The contemporary filibuster cannot be justified on the grounds of a 
Senate tradition of unlimited debate.  The contemporary filibuster is not a 
mechanism of debate; it is a mechanism of obstruction, plain and simple.  
And in recent Congresses, it has become a mechanism to be applied to 
nearly every measure to come before the Senate, such that it can now 
accurately be said that most measures require sixty votes to pass the 
Senate.  This, I have argued, is unconstitutional, for it violates a structural 
principle against permanent minority obstruction in a house of Congress.  
The question for a constitutionally conscientious Senator should simply be 
which of the available options to bring Senate practice in line with this 
constitutional requirement she supports. 
 
                                                                                                                          
“that the cloture threshold should be changed into a temporary veto that a Senate majority can override 
after one year”).  
242 For more on this idea, see S. Res. 416, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010); Tom Harkin, Fixing the 
Filibuster: Restoring Real Democracy in the Senate, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 67, 76–78 (2010), 
available at http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_Harkin.pdf.  
